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Abstract 
Theory: The spatial model of elections can better be represented by using 
conditional logit than by multinomial logit. The spatial model, and random 
utility models in general, suffer from a failure to adequately consider the sub­
stitutability of candidates sharing similar or identical issue positions. 
Hypotheses: Multinomial logit is not much better than successive applications 
of binomial logit . Conditional logit allows for considering more interesting 
political questions than does multinomial logit. The spatial model may not 
correspond to voter decision-making in multiple-candidate settings. Multi­
nomial probit allows for a relaxation of the IIA condition and this should 
improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties. 
Methods: Comparisons of binomial logit, multinomial logit, conditional logit, 
and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from a three-party 
election. 
Results: Multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit. Con­
ditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties , whereas multi­
nomial logit is not . Multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit 
when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters. 
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1 The Theory and the Practice of Issue Voting Mod­
els 
The spatial model of voting has been a dominant paradigm in the voting literature over 
the past 25 years (Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook 1970; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich
1984), supplanting the 'funnel of causality' (Campbell et al. ,  1960) which had a brief
reign beginning around 1960. The spatial model is scientifically appealing because of its 
elegance. It is easy to state: a person votes for the party nearest to him or her on the 
issues. Further, the spatial model is intuitively appealing to those political scientists who 
believe that politics is about policy - it states succinctly that issues ·matter. 
Most quantitative analyses of elections based on the spatial model have involved 
two-party elections; however most elections involve more than two candidates or parties. 
Elections dominated by two parties are the rule in the United States, but not the rest of 
the world. In this paper we clarify the methodological implications of using the spatial 
model to understand multi-candidate or multi-party elections, and we seek to correct 
some common and widespread misconceptions about the discrete choice models which are 
best suited for studying multi-candidate or multi-party elections . We first demonstrate 
that two simple econometric techniques commonly used in the literature, binomial logit 
and multinomial logit, are in fact almost identical. Multinomial logit is a model of only 
pair-wise comparisons, and the only real difference between the two techniques is that 
multinomial logit produces more efficient estimates (i . e . ,  all other things being equal,
multinomial logit estimates will converge to the true model parameters more quickly 
than will binomial logit estimates) since it uses more sample information than binomial
logit. 
However, we then demonstrate that. multinomial logit is a very limited technique 
since it represents a very limited substantive view of politics . The multinomial logit 
model includes only information about the individual voters , but does not include the 
issue positions of the parties and the candidates. Since issue positions of parties and 
candidates are fundamental to both the spatial theory and our intuitions about the 
political world, multinomial logit is not the most useful discrete choice model. 
We argue that in most electoral settings multinomial logit is likely to represent 
the wrong model. We strongly advocate conditional logit as an alternative to multino­
mial logit for estimating models of elections. Conditional logit is 'conditional on the 
characteristics of the choices; ' thus it explicitly allows for measures of characteristics of 
the parties . At a minimum, the spatial model requires conditional logit since the spa­
tial model is based on positions of voters relative to parties. Thus, if you care about 
questions of strategy of candidates or parties, you must .. use conditional logit.1 The con­
ditional logit estimator is available for use in many econometrics packages, and is no 
less robust or harder to estimate than multinomial logit .2 We are simply making the
argument that conditional logit is a better match than multinomial logit for common 
political science theories of elections. Conditional logit is capable of answering questions 
that multinomial logit estimates cannot. This should be a critical criteria in choosing an 
estimator. 
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This raises an important question: what are the methodoligical implications of 
using the spatial model to specify empirical models of multi-candidate or multi-party 
elections? Unfortunately, moving from a two-candidate to a multi-candidate setting 
suggests a problem for both the spatial model and most common econometric choice 
models, since the spatial model and all commonly used discrete choice models impose 
the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) on individual voters. IIA
implies that the ratio of the probability of choosing one party to the probability of 
choosing a second party is unchanged for individual voters if a third party enters the 
race. In simple terms, this implies that in a contest between a liberal and a conservative 
party, the entry of a second conservative party would not alter the relative probability 
of an individual voter choosing between the two initial parties. However, because the 
two conservative parties are close together in the issue space, and hence are likely to be 
viewed as substitutes by voters , our intuition suggests that these relative probabilities 
will change. 
There are at least three reasons to search for a model that does not impose the IIA 
condition. First , assuming IIA could lead to incorrect estimates of the model parameters. 
Second, assuming IIA to be true when it is not will be particularly troubling with regards
to one of the more interesting questions regarding multi-party elections: what happens 
when one party is removed from the choice set? If IIA is violated, then· the voters who had 
been choosing a removed alternative may shift their votes in an unanticipated manner. 
Third, we would like some substantive insight into the choice process used by individuals, 
imposing the IIA condition on voters implies that we are starting our research with a 
very restrictive assumption about that process. 
Unfortunately, both conditional logit and multinomial logit suffer from the lim­
itation that they assume IIA. The final point we make in this paper is that there are
models available (multinomial probit and the general-extreme value models) which do
not impose IIA. However, they avoid imposing IIA through the disturbance term rather 
than the systemic component. While this may not be an entirely satisfactory approach 
to resolving the IIA problem in models of voting decisions, it is better than ignoring the 
problem of IIA. 
We begin by describing multinomial logit and show that it is the same as suc­
cessive applications of binomial logit. We then describe conditional logit and illustrate 
its advantages over multinomial logit by demonstrating that we can measure the impact 
of changes in party issue-positions on aggregate vote-shares: a task which is impossible 
with multinomial logit. We then describe why a general class of models will impose IIA. 
And we provide estimates using multinomial probit , a model which does not impose IIA, 
showing that IIA is indeed violated in some real world examples. 
2 Logit Models 
We begin with a discussion of two logit models which have been used widely in economics, 
but more sparingly in political science. The first model we consider is multinomial logit, 
which is characterized by a systemic component that is a linear function of characteristics 
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of the individual, as opposed to characteristics of the alternative (i .e . , of the party) . The
second model we consider is the conditional logit model, which does allow for choice­
specific independent variables which measure characteristics of the party.3 We also discuss 
the common assumptions these two logit models make about the distribution of the 
disturbances . We characterize the basic properties of several discrete choice models in 
Table 1. 
[Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 shows that multinomial logit is the most restrictive discrete choice model 
we discuss in this paper; it models the choice probabilities as functions only of charac­
teristics of the individual voter, it does not allow the error terms to be correlated across 
. choices, and it provides few answers to important political questions. Conditional logit , 
however, is less restrictive since it allows for choice probabilities to be functions of the 
characteristics of both the individual and the alternatives. Conditional logit does not 
allow for correlations between the errors. Both the generalized-extreme value model and 
the multinomial probit model allow for choice-specific right-hand side variables , for the 
relaxation of the assumption of independent error terms, and can shed light on what 
might happen were parties to move in the issue space or drop out of elections. The 
generalized-extreme value model is more restrictive than the multinomial probit model 
since the former allows for only certain error correlations, while the multinomial probit 
model allows for a more flexible error correlation specification. In the following sections 
of the paper we discuss each model in more detail. 
2.1 Multinomial Logit 
Multinomial logit specifies the ith individual's utility of the jlh choice as:
uij = /3jXi + uij (1) 
where Xi is a vector of characteristics ofthe ith individual. Note that this model estimates
a set of coefficients for each choice: /3j is subscripted based on the alternatives . For one 
of the choices the coefficients are normalized to be zero. 
The probabilities of the ith individual choosing the jth alternative are given by:
and this implies: 
/3'.X·e J i 
Pij = ------,..,----
1 + "'m-1 ef3f Xi L...l=l 
/3'.X·e J i 
ef3�Xi 
(2) 
(3) 
Equation (3) implies that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing alternative j to alterna­
tive k for individual i is independent of the probability of choosing the other alternatives .
This is the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" property. 
4 
The first point we emphasize about multinomial logit is that each set of coeffi­
cients are identical to the coefficients of a binomial logit model us1ng only individuals 
who choose either alternative j or k, and ignoring all other individuals. This is a key
part of the multinomial logit model: it is identical to comparing two choices and ignor­
ing all the other choices . Thus if an 'ignored' choice affects the relative probabilities of 
choosing the two included choices differently, the� the model will perform badly. An im­
portant corollary to this is that multinomial logit cannot produce richer empirical models 
of politics than binomial logit, since they are equivalent models. We demonstrate that 
multinomial logit and binomial logit are identical by three separate techniques below: 1 )  
we describe the econometric intuition for what the two models are actually estimating; 2 )  
we offer binomial logit and multinomial logit estimates from survey data; and 3) we of­
fer a simulation demonstrating that multinomial logit and binomial logit give equivalent 
results. 
2.2 Multinomial Logit is Equivalent to Binomial Logit 
To see that multinomial logit and binomial logit are estimating the exact same thing we 
need to first describe in some detail the underlying assumptions that both models are 
based on . Multinomial logit and binomial logit both produce estimates of parameters of 
a random utility model. Random utility models assume that while individuals maximize 
their expected utility, these utilities are not known to researchers and must be assumed 
to be random variables. This allows us to assume that utility can be partitioned into an 
observed or systemic component , and an unobserved or random component . Consider 
such a model: 
ui1 f31Xi + ui1 
Ui2 f32Xi + Ui2 
ui3 f33Xi + ui3 
Here Uij represents the utility to the ith individual for the jth party, and Xi is measuring
characteristics of the ith voter. /3j represents a parameter vector determining the con­
tribution of voter characteristics to utility for choice j. In both multinomial logit and
binomial logit one parameter is normalized to zero. Say /33 is normalized to 0. Then 
if choice 1 is omitted, binomial logit will generate consistent estimates of {32 using only 
individuals who choose 2 or 3. Omitting choice 2 ,  binomial logit will generate consisterit 
estimates of {31. 
A common point of confusion is the claim that binomial logit will not produce 
consistent estimates because it ignores the presence of a third choice. However, if IIA 
holds (which both binomial logit and multinomial logit posit) , then this has no effect: bi­
nomial logit will produce consistent estimates of the parameters because the maintained 
model implies that the presence or absence of the third choice has no impact on the rela­
tive probabilities of choosing either of the other two choices . There is a loss of efficiency 
because some information is discarded. But binomial logit still produces consistent esti­
mates of the true model parameters, a point proven by Hausman and McFadden in their 
article describing a test for IIA (1984, p. 1222- 1223) . 
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Now consider estimating the above model with multinomial logit . Again, we nor­
malize f33 to 0. Now multinomial logit gives us consistent estimates of the true parameters 
/31 and f32; consistent estimates of the exact same parameters we estimated with binomial
logit! This is the central point: once IIA is assumed, binomial logit and multinomial 
logit are producing estimates of the same parameters. Thus using multinomial logit 
rather than binomial logit does not give estimates of a richer model positing a complex 
three-party choice process. 
Unfortunately, these points are missed by most "sophisticated" analyses in the 
literature. In one prominent example, Whitten and Palmer (1996) urge empirical re­
searchers examining multi-party elections to use multinomial logit instead of binomial 
logit , based on their comparison of the two techniques in data taken from British and 
Dutch elections: "Comparisons of the parameter estimates produced by each procedure 
and the substantive inferences derived from those estimates demonstrate the superior­
ity of multinomial logit over BNL (binomial logit) as a means of modeling multi-party
vote choice" (1996: 236). Whitten and Palmer reach this conclusion by comparing two 
fundamentally different specifications of the dependent variable of their models. The 
binomial choice models they estimate examine the probability of voting for one party, 
relative to the remaining two major parties (the Conservatives in the 1987 UK election
relative to Labour and the Alliance) . Their multinomial logit models examine the like­
lihood of voting for one party from a pair of parties (Conservatives vs. Labour, and
the Alliance vs. Labour) . Had they estimated successive binomial models for Conser­
vative versus Labour and then Alliance versus Labour, no doubt Whitten and Palmer 
would have noticed the equivilance of the estimated effects of these models. Whitten 
and Palmer are essentially comparing estimates across models with completely different 
dependent variables. That the results differ is no surprise. But it should be looked at 
as a symptom of measurement error on the dependent variable (incorrectly recoding a
trichotomous variable as a dichotomous variable) , not as evidence that multinomial logit
estimates contain information that binomial logit estimates do not. 
2.3 Equivalence of Multinomial logit and Binomial Logit - An 
Example 
That multinomial logit and binomial logit simply reproduce coefficients representing the 
same pairwise comparisons of choices can be shown in actual data from multi-party elec­
tions. Here we focus on data taken from the 1987 B_ritish general election survey (Heath
1989) .4 The specification of the models we estimate is identical to that used by Alvarez, 
Bowler and Nagler (1996) . The model specification highlights the importance of issues, 
economic factors, and party politics, and departs in important ways from other mod-. 
els of British elections. We include a series of seven issue placement variables (defense
spending, position on the "phillips curve" , taxation, nationalization of industries, redis­
tribution of wealth, crime, and welfare) as well as the voter's beliefs about recent changes
in national inflation, unemployment and taxation. To control for factors cited in other 
works on British elections, we include variables which control for region, class, and other 
demographic effects. 
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In Table 2 we present estimates of this model specification modified for multi­
nomial logit and binomial logit . The issue positions are operationalized as individual­
specific: they are the voter's stated position on each issue, rather than the distance from 
the voter to the party. We treat Alliance as the base, or reference, category. Thus we 
report in the first two columns the estimates for Conservative relative to Alliance , for 
multinomial logit and binomial logit, respectively; and we report in columns 3 and 4 
estimates for Labour relative to Alliance, again for multinomial logit and binomial logit , 
respectively. The multinomial logit estimates come from full information maximum like­
lihood utilizing the entire sample; the binomial logit estimates come from two separate 
binomial logit estimates. The first binomial logit omits voters who chose Labour; the 
second binomial logit omits voters who chose Conservative. 5 
[Table 2 Here] 
Cursory inspection of Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients for each re­
spective pair-wise comparison are, though not actually identical, statistically indistin­
guishable across the multinomial logit and binomial logit estimates. Multinomial logit 
and binomial logit do not produce identical estimates of the coefficients in the samples; 
the multinomial logit estimator is working with more data than either of the two separate 
sets of binomial logit estimates. But the point is that they produce consistent estimates 
of the same parameters. Thus while the multinomial and binomial logit estimates in 
Table 2 are not identical to each other, occular examination of them is convincing evi­
dence that they are awfully close to each other. As an estimation technique multinomial 
logit should be preferred to binomial logit because it is more efficient , but this simply 
means that it will approach the true parameters more quickly than will binomial logit .6 
However, multinomial logit is a model of pairwise comparisons and as such it posits the 
same choice process as binomial logit models do. 
2.4 . Equivalence of Multinomial logit and Binomial Logit - A
Simulation 
To further illustrate the equivalence of multinomial logit and succesive applications of 
binomial logit we offer a simulation. We specified the following· spatial model: 
-2 *(xi - Clx)2
-2 * (xi - C2x)2
-2 * (xi - C3x)2
3 * (Yi - Cly)2 + uil
3 * (Yi - C2y)2 + Ui2
3 * (Yi - C3y)2 + Ui3
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
where xi and Yi indicate the ith respondent 's ideal point on the X and Y axes, respectively; 
and C Jx and C Jy indicate the position of the ;th party on the X and Y axes, respectively.
The utility of the ith individual for the ;th party is a function of the distance between
the party and the individual on the X and Y axes; and the individual has separable 
preferences. Obviously since this model depends upon the position of the decision-maker 
relative to the position of the parties, the characteristics of the parties (alternatives) are
relevant . We placed three parties in a two dimensional issue-space: Party 1 at (-2,0), 
Party 2 at (0,2), and Party 3 at (2,0). The positions of 5000 voters were drawn from two 
7 
independent normal distributions, both with mean 0 and var.iance 2 ,  determining their 
placement on the x and y axes. Consistent with both multinomial logit and binomial 
logit models, the disturbances are independent and identically distributed with type I 
extreme value distributions. 
We first estimated a model with only the respondent's characteristics on the 
right-hand side. This is our naive model, which we estimated with both binomial logit 
and multinomial logit (later we estimate a correct systemic specification using conditional 
logit) .  The parameter estimates for multinomial logit and binomial logit are repor.ted in 
Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 report the probability of choosing choice 2 relative to choice 1 
for multinomial logit and binomial logit respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates 
for the probability of choosing choice 3 relative to choice 1, again for multinomial logit 
and binomial logit respectively. The estimates are almost identical because they are 
estimates of the same parameters. As our sample size increases, the estimates would 
become indistinguishable. Again, this illustrates that multinomial logit cannot tell us 
more about politics than a simple set of successive binomial logit estimates, because the 
multinomial logit estimates are estimates of the exact same phenomena. But notice that 
both sets of parq,meters specify the wrong model. To estimate the right model, which 
would include the distance from the respondents to the parties on the issues, we need 
conditional logit . 
[Table 3 Here]
2.5 Conditional Logit 
The conditional logit model (i . e . ,  conditional on the choices) is a fundamentally different 
model than multinomial logit or binomial logit . Conditional logit employs the same max­
imum likelihood estimation technique as multinomial logit, but allows for an individual's 
utility of an alternative to be based upon the characteristics of the alternative. Thus the 
ith individual's utility of the ;th alternative will be given by:
(7) 
where Xij indicates a variable measuring the characteristics of alternative j relative to
individual i. Multinomial logit did not include characteristics of the alternative on the
right-hand side. The characteristics of the alternative are subscripted with respect to 
the individual because these characteristics could vary across individuals: such as the 
ideological distance between the party and the respondent. The model can be extended 
to include individual specific characteristics as multinomial logit does (there is no separate 
name for the combined model in the literature, so we continue to refer to this model as 
conditional logit ): 
(8) 
where ai is a vector of characteristics of the ith individual. Thus this model will yield one
coefficient ((3) for each alternative-specific variable, and J coefficients ( 'ljJ1, 'l/J2, . . . , 'ljJ J) for
each individual-specific variable where J is the number of alternatives. However, as with 
multinomial logit, one of the sets of 'ljJs is normalized (generally to 0, and generally for 
the first alternative) ,  hence actually J - 1 sets of 'I/J's are estimated.
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Probabilities will be of the form: 
ef3Xij + 'l/Jjai
P,,.. - ��-----.,=-=-=��-..,.-� iJ l:k=l ef3Xik + 'l/Jkai (9) 
Both conditional logit and multinomial logit models assume that the disturbances, Uij, 
are independent across alternatives. 7 
2.6 Conditional Logit - An Example 
To demonstrate what conditional logit estimates look like we again turn to the data from 
the 1987 British general election, and here we contrast conditional logit estimates to the 
multinomial logit and pair-wise binomial logit results presented earlier. We present the 
conditional logit estimates in Table 4. We do not have a great deal to say about these 
estimates here, except to note two points. First, the specification of the issue distance 
variables differs from those in Table 2. Here, we specify the issue effects as the distance 
between the voter and the party on each issue. 8 We estimate the issue distance parameters 
as choice-specific variables; that is, we estimate only one issue distance parameter for each 
issue, whereas in Table 2 there were two estimated coefficients for each issue: representing 
the position of the respondent, not the distance from the respondent to party. Thus 
conditional logit permits a much better speeification of the relationship between issues, 
parties, and voters than does multinomial logit . Second, we include the other variables 
representing economic perceptions, class, and demographic status as individual-specific 
variables. Thus this conditional logit model has both choice-specific and individual­
specific coefficients. The first column of individual specific coefficients is for Conservative 
relative to Alliance, the second column of individual specific coefficients is for Labour 
relative to Alliance. 
[Table 4 Here]
With both the multinomial logit estimates from Table 2 and the conditional iogit 
estimates we could compute tables of first differences - i.e. ,  the effect of a change in the 
independent variable on the probability of choosing each party - based on the individual's 
characteristics. These first differences could provide the answers to a set of questions 
regarding the impact of voters' characteristics on vote-choice. However, an interesting 
substantive question is not only what is the effect of changes in the characteristics of the 
voter; but what is the effect of changes in the characteristics of the parties or parties. 
Conditional logit lets us examine what happens as one, two or three, parties change their 
positions in the issue space. Multinomial logit does not let us do this. 
For instance, a major question Tegarding British elections is to what extent the 
extremity of Labour's left-wing positions hurt the party. This cannot be answered by 
considering differences caused by moving voters; rather to answer this we need to see 
what would happen if Labour moved on the issues (or, to be more precise , if respondents' 
perceptions of Labour's position changed systematically) . To test this we reset Labour's
mean perceived issue position to be ! standard deviation to the left , and ! standard
deviation to the right of its actual mean perceived issue position on each of the seven 
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issues. We then computed the distance Labour would be from each voter at these new 
positions, and computed the probability of each voter voting for each of the three parties 
under these two hypothetical scenarios. 9 The difference in predicted aggregate vote-share 
at the two hypothetical positions for Labour is the impact of a shift on that issue. Vve 
report the estimated aggregate vote-shares for each of the three parties with Labour at 
both hypothetical positions on each issue, as well as the difference, in Table 5 .  Note 
again that this is an estimate aggregated across all respondents. The largest impact a 
one standard-deviation change in Labour's position on any single issue would have is on 
nationalization of industry: where Labour moving one standard deviation would yield 
them a 3.1 % increase in aggregate vote share. The last row of the table indicates that 
were Labour to move one standard deviation on all seven issues simultaneously they 
would increase their vote-share by 6 .8%; with 3 .6% of that coming at the Conservative 
party's expense and 3.2% coming at the Alliance's expense. Using this technique we 
could also determine the optimal placement of Labour on each of the seven issues.10 
[Table 5 Here]
We present no similar table for multinomial logit because it is impossible to do so. 
The multinomial logit estimates cannot be used to make any inferences about the effect 
of moving the parties because the position of the party is not part of the multinomial 
logit model. This, not the precise magnitude of impacts of Labour's movement on the 
issues, is what we wish to emphasize with Table 5. The impact of a change by the party 
on the issues is a major question regarding elections. Yet multinomial logit can supply 
absolutely no information about this .11 This is what we feel is the major reason for using 
conditional logit rather than multinomial logit. We are political scientists. We should 
analyze p olitics. 
3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
While conditional logit is good, it is not perfect. A major characteristic of both multi­
nomial logit and conditional logit is that they impose the "Irrelevance of Independent 
Alternatives" (IIA) property. As we described earlier, IIA holds when the ratio of the 
probability of choosing alternative j to the probability of choosing alternative k is not
changed if more choices are added to or subtracted from the choice set , or: 
PiilSs 
_ 
PiilSP V . k n IS - p IS J, 's,pFik s ik p 
(10)  
where Ss and Sp denote sets of alternatives, j, k E Sp, and j, k E S8, and PijlSs
denotes the probability of the ith individual choosing alternative j from choice-set S8•
To maintain the IIA condition is troubling when viewed from the perspective of several 
prominent political science theories of voter decision-making in elections. First , consider 
a spatial model of voting where individuals vote for the party closest to their ideal point 
in an issue-space. If we imagine a new party entering an election, our intuition is that 
the new party would take most of his/her votes from the parties closest to him/her in 
the issue space. This is not consistent with IIA at the individual level (though IIA may 
hold at the individual level and not preclude such a result at the aggregate level). 
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In simple terms, IIA implies that in a contest between a liberal and a conservative 
party, the entry of a second conservative party will not alter the relative probability than 
an individual voter chooses between the initial two parties. However, because the two 
conservative parties are close together in the issue space, and hence are likely to be viewed 
as substitutes by voters, our intuition suggests that the relative probabilities will change . 
Consider an extreme case of an election in a single-dimensional space that initially 
has 2 parties (i.e., ISsl = 2). Say the two parties are a liberal and conservative (parties 
numbers 1 and 2, respectively) . And say voter i is a moderate who is indifferent between
the two choices. Then: Fi1 = Fi2 = 0 .5 ,  and Fii/ Fi2 = 1 .  Now add another conservative
party to the set , one that is indistinguishable from party·2 .  The voter might still have 
probability of . 5  of voting liberal and .5  of voting conservative. After all, s/he really still 
only has two unique choices: vote liberal or vote conservative. Choosing between the 
two identical conservative parties would presumably be done by the flip of a coin. This 
would yield : Fi1 = . 5 ,  Fi2 = Fi3 = .25; which would mean that Fii/ Fi2 = 2 .  This is a 
violation of the IIA condition. It is important to bear in mind that the set of probabilities 
presented here based on the entry of the third party here are derived from a choice process 
we assume for the voter. 
Now consider a more complex case. Figure 1 portrays the three parties from our 
earlier simulations, and a voter at (0 ,0) .  Here we have a two-dimensional issue space, with 
one dimension for economic issues and the other for social issues. Notice that Parties 1 ,  
2 ,  and 3 are viewed as 'equivalent' by the voter: they are each two units away from the 
voter. In fact in the two-dimensional space it is easy to see that there are potentially an 
unlimited number of parties that would be viewed by the voter as equivalent: all parties 
on a circle of radius 2 centered at origin would appear as identical to this voter according 
to the spatial model . However, politically the three parties depicted clearly represent 
very distinct choices: Party 1 is moderate on the social issue, but to the right on the 
economic issue; Party 2 is also socially moderate, but to the left on the economic issue; 
and Party 3 is to the right on the social issue, but moderate on the economic issue. Now 
we add Party 4 at ( 1 . 95 ,0 ) ,  which is viewed by the spatial model as being ' .05 different ' 
than Party 1 on the economic issue, and also only ' .05 different' than Party 2 vis-a-vis 
the voter on the economic issue and even only ' .05 different' than Party 3 vis-a-vis the 
voter taking into account both issue-dimensions. Yet most students of politics would say 
that 9 out of 10  voters would tell us that Parties 1 and 4 are very similar, and that Party 
4 is very different from Party 2 or Party 3 .  
[Figure 1 Here] 
Because the spatial model abstracts away the closeness of the parties to each 
other by only measuring the distance from parties to the voter the spatial model has no 
notion of parties as substitutes . The spatial model no more views identical parties to 
be substitutes for one another than it does for parties who are located at diametrically 
opposed positions on the issue scale - as long as the parties are equidistant from the voter 
they are treated the same. The spatial model cannot pick up closeness of parties to each 
other. 
In addition to posing a challenge for spatial models, IIA poses a challenge for 
1 1  
retrospective voting models. Retrospective voting models posit individuals' choices to 
be functions of their evaluations of the incumbent party. Such models are rarely explicit 
on how multiple alternatives to the incumbent party should be treated; but it seems 
safe to suppose that the non-incumbent alternatives would be grouped by voters and 
treated as having some inherent similarity. In fact the choice-process would presumably 
look exactly like the choice process posited by a nested-logit model: where a voter first 
chooses between two sets - incumbent party and all other parties - and if the chosen set 
has more than one choice within it then the voter would then choose from among, those 
choices. 
Again, consider the extreme choice. Say the probability of choosing the incum­
bent party is Pi! and the probability of choosing the jlh challenger's party is PiCj. If a 
voter first chooses between {incumbent party} vs. {non-incumbents party}, and chooses 
the first set with probability Pis1 and the second set with probability Pis2, and if all 
non-incumbents parties are treated equally, then Pi! will be independent of the number 
of challengers and PiCj is determined by the number of challengers. Obviously the ratio 
Pi!/ PiCJ is not independent of the number of alternatives, and IIA is again violated.
The above examples are political science analogues of the classic red-bus/blue­
bus problem in econometrics. Imagine an individual who can choose between two modes 
of transportation: a red-bus or a car . If the individual is indifferent between these modes 
then the respective probabilities will be . 5. Now if a blue-bus is added to the choice 
set there is no reason to think this alters a person's probability of choosing to travel by 
car (since the buses differ only in color and on no other relevant dimension) , it seems 
apparent that the probability of choosing a car for most individuals will remain . 5 .  Yet 
the probability of choosing the blue bus will now be .25 ,  and the probability of choosing 
the red-bus will be .25 (assuming people are indifferent as to the color of the bus they 
ride in) . Thus the ratio of Pear/ Hzue-bus will change and IIA is violated. 
In the spatial model analog to the red-bus/blue-bus problem, we have two parties 
with (almost) identical positions on the ideological dimension. If a voter chooses on the 
basis of i deology, and not parties, it is irrelevant how many parties occupy a particular 
ideological position. Yet models which impose IIA insist that the voters choose among 
parties, not among issue positions, since parties cannot be substitutes in these models. 
Random utility models more generally do not allow for any relationship between 
the choices in the systemic component of the model, as each systemic component of 
utility is based on the relationship between a single alternative and the decision maker. 
So again, two parties equidistant from the voter are treated identically: whether they are 
diametrically opposed to each other or at identical issue positions. This is where a bad 
fit between the spatial model and random utility models and our intuition about politics 
occurs. Currently only random utility models with disturbances correlated across choices 
allow for the sort of direct comparison of choices which matches our intuition about 
voter behavior. We believe it is a weakness of random utility models that they do not 
account for substitutability (or similarity) of alternatives in the systemic component .12
Development of such models would allow for tests of competing theories of voter decision­
making. 
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where: 
In general, models that give the probability of choosing parties as : 
Pii _ J(Xii' Ai, Zi) 
Pik J(Xik, Ai, Zk) 
• Xii = characteristics of the ith voter relative to the jth party
• Ai characteristics of the ith voter
• zj = characteristics of the lh party
(11) 
will always impose IIA. This is because if we look at this equation, we see that the only 
things involved in determining Pij / Pik are the characteristics of the voter and the lh and
kth parties; neither the existence nor characteristics of any other parties come into play.
Thus IIA is guaranteed to hold: there is no way that the inclusion of additional choices 
could alter Pij/ Pik· This is the crux of the problem. To avoid assuming or imposing 
IIA we must have a model where Pij/ Pik incorporates properties of choices other than k 
and j; and we would prefer that these be incorporated in the systemic component of the
model. But allowing for correlated disturbances does not pick this up; it just picks up 
omitted variables that are not present for both identical choices. 
4 Models Which Do Not Assume IIA 
There are two models of discrete choice which do not assume IIA: the generalized extreme­
value model (GEV) and the multinomial probit model (MNP) .13 The GEV model imposes
the constraint that the researcher must a priori specify a grouping of choices. The 
multinomial probit model is more flexible: it imposes no a priori constraint on how 
respondents view the choices. Multinomial probit allows for both individual specific and 
alternative-specific variables. The IIA assumption is removed because the error process 
of the multinomial probit model allow for correlations between the disturbances for the 
different choices.14 
In Table 6 we present multinomial pro bit estimates of a model of the 1987 British 
election specified exactly as our conditional logit model was. The structure of the coef­
ficients is the same as for conditional logit : we have one set of coefficients for the issue­
distance variables, and two sets of coefficients for the individual-level variables . What 
is different here is the estimate of the error correlations across the disturbances. Two 
of the estimated error correlations are statistically significant : the COI'.relation between 
the disturbances for Labour and Alliance is .34,  and the correlation between the distur­
bances for Conservative-and l:;ahour is -.39. Thus we··are at least 95% confident that IIA 
is violated. And the grouping of (Labour, Alliance) and non-grouping of (Conservative, 
Labour) is revealed. 
[Table 6 Here]
We see that IIA was violated. So what? As we stated earlier, this suggests 
that inferences made of a hypothetical two-party race will be particularly suspect. To 
see the extent of the possible error, we computed predicted vote-shares for Labour and 
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Conservative in a two-party race with Alliance omitted using both the conditional logit 
estimates reported in Table 4, and the multinomial probit estimates reported in Table 6 .  
Table 7 gives the estimated vote shares in  two and three party races using both models. 
The conditional logit and multinomial probit estimates of three party vote shares are 
very close :  the Conservative and Labour shares differ by only . 3% across the two models. 
However, the two-party shares differs by 1 . 7% across the two models. A difference of 
1 .  7% of the vote may not seem very large, but in close elections this is could be the 
difference between winning and losing. 
[Table 7 Here] 
This result demonstrates the critical nature of the presence of the Alliance in 
British politics for the electoral fortunes of Labour. With the Alliance a viable force 
in British politics in 1987, Labour is clearly disadvantaged (Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 
1996) . Additionally, this shows the way in which the multinomial probit model can 
help answer important political questions when the IIA condition is not met in electoral 
situations . 
4.1 IIA Do.es Not Aggregate 
However, we want to be very clear on one potential point of confusion. All statements 
about IIA refer to relative probabilities of individual voters choosing parties. It is 
possible for IIA to hold at the individual level, and for the aggregate claim that "a 
second conservative party will 'take' voters from an existing conservative party" to be 
true. This may appear to be a paradox, but it is really just a matter of arithmetic. 
We illustrate this with a simple example. Consider a spatial model where voters choose 
between parties based on the positions of the parties on one issue. The ith voter's utility
for the jlh party is simply given by:
(12)  
where xi is  the ith voter's position, Cj is  the jlh party's position, and Eij is  a random
disturbance term with an extreme value distribution. Assume we initially have two 
parties: Liberal (L) at -1  and Conservative (C) at 1 .  Now assume we have a 5-person 
electorate with voters at : -2 ,  - .5, 0, . 25, and . 75. Table 8 gives the probability they will 
vote for each of the two parties in a two-party race in columns 2 and 3. The estimate 
of the aggregate vote-share for each party would be computed by taking the mean of 
the probabilities over all five voters. This gives relative vote-shares of .46 and .54, for 
the Conservatives and the Liberals respectively. Now add a third party: the Right­
Moderates (M) at .5. The probabilities of each voter choosing any of the three parties 
in a three-way race are given in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 6. If one looks at the 
ratio of PiL/{L,C}/Pic/{L,C} and compares it to PiL/{L,C,Nl}/PiC/{L,C,A![} for any 
respondent , they are equal. However, if one looks at the ratio of the means of PiL to 
PiC across the two different hypothetical elections they are different . In the first race the 
Conservatives are predicted to have 46% of the two-way vote. In the three-way race the 
Conservatives would only have 37% (i .e . ,  .23 / ( . 23 + .40)) of the two-way vote between 
the Conservatives and Liberals. Thus, consistent with our intuition, the entry of the 
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Right-Moderates - a second right-party - takes more votes from the Conservatives than 
from the Liberals. 
(Table 8 Here] 
5 Conclusions 
We have demonstrated three points in this paper. First, multinomial logit is no magic 
estimator compared to binomial logit . It offers efficiency gains; but it is estimating 
precisely the same parameters as is binomial logit. Thus any claims that multinomial lo git 
embodies an individual choice process any more complex than two-party comparisons are 
false. 
Second, if one is interested in more strategic questions about politics, such as 
what would happen if parties or candidates moved in the issue space, and what would 
be the effect of additional parties entering the race (i .e . , questions that seem to come
to mind every Presidential Primary season in the United States) , then multinomial logit
is the wrong model to use and researchers should utilize conditional logit. Multinomial 
logit simply ignores what is interesting in elections. Conditional logit utilizes the vital 
information of where parties are located in the issue space, and therefore is a better 
technique for multi-party and multi-candidate elections than multinomial logit . 
Third, binomial logit , multinomial logit, and conditional logit are all quite limited 
in that they impose the IIA restriction upon voters. Since conditional logit is representing 
the classic spatial model quite faithfully, this identifies a limitation in the spatial model. 
The failure of the spatial model to consider the closeness of the parties to each other, 
as well as to the voter, may present problems in multi-candidate elections. There are 
estimation techniques that allow for 'grouping' of similar choices and thus remove the IIA 
restriction: both GEY and multinomial probit allow for this.15 And we have shown that 
utilizing multinomial .probit allows for more accurate predictions in real elections of the 
impact of removal of a third party. But both multinomial probit and GEY allow for this 
grouping in the stochastic. (random) component of the model. We think that if we have
some theoretical reason to believe parties are grouped by voters, then it is important to 
try to model that grouping in the systemic component of the model. We believe that 
this will be an important task in the future for better understanding voting situations 
where voters have many choices. 
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6 Appendix A: Computing Unconditional Probabil­
ities from Binomial logit Probabilities
Estimating a model via a series of three binomial logits gives one
 the ability to estimate
three sets of probabilities:
• P12 Prob(� 1 I {1, 2})
• P21 Prob(� 2 I {1, 2}) 
• P13 Prob(� 1 I {1, 3}) 
• P31 Prob(1� 3 I {1, 3}) 
• P23 Prob(1� 2 I {2, 3}) 
• P32 Prob(1� 3 I {2, 3}) 
What we would like to recover are the unconditional probabilities
:
• P1 Prob(1� 1 I {1, 2, 3}) 
• P2 = Prob(� 2 j {1,2,3})
• P3 = Prob(1� 3 I {1, 2, 3}) 
We know 
1 = P1 
And since IIA holds, 
P1 
P3 
So, 
P3 = 
Similarly, 
Pi 
P2 
And, 
P2 = 
Now we substitute, 
+ P2 + 
P13 
P31 
Pi (
P31)
P13 
P12 
P21 
Pi (
P21)
P12 
P3 
1 P1 + Pi (
P21)
P12 
+ Pi(
P31)
P13 
P1(1 + 
P21 
+ 
P31)
P12 P13 
1/(1 + 
P21 P31)+ -
P12 P13 
( 13) 
(14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
( 17) 
(18)  
(19)  
(20) 
(21 )  
(22)  
Since P12, P21, P13, and P31 are all observed from the binomial lo git estimates; 
we can compute the unconditional probability P1. And similar calculations give the 
unconditional probabilities P2 and P3. 
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7 Appendix B: Multinomial Logit Gives Reduced 
Form Parameters of the Conditional Logit Model 
The difference between conditional logit and multinomial logit is that conditional logit in­
cludes another piece of information: the position of the party. It would appear that since 
the conditional logit model makes use of more information than the multinomial logit 
model, it should perform better. It should more accurately mirror the truth (the spatial 
model) ; and hence give better predictions of individual behavior . In fact, we demonstrate
here that when the true model is the common spatial model based on a quadratic utility 
function, multinomial logit recovers reduced form estimates of the spatial model. Hence . 
the probabilities estimated with multinomial logit will be identical to the conditional 
logit probabilities . And any estimates of effects of changes in Xi from multinomial logit 
will be identical to such estimates from conditional logit . But, again, one cannot know a 
principle point of interest here: the effect of changes in party characteristics on voting. 
First , we offer an analytical result for two parties showing that MNL recovers 
reduced form estimates of a common specification of the spatial model .16 We first define 
several things: 
• Xi ith Voter's Position in the issue space
• Cj lh Party's Position in the Issue Space
• Dij = Distance from ith Voter to lh Party
Now according to the classic spatial model; the ith individual's utility of the jlh 
choice is: 
or , 
U · · - -{3· * (X · - C·)21) - J i J (23) 
Uij = -{Jj * Dij (24) 
This fits nicely into the conditional logit random utility model (RUM) setup: 
where 
Now notice that : 
Di1 
Di2 
Di1 - Di2 
a* 
b* 
X[ - 2XiC1 + Ci 
Xi2 - 2XiC2 + Ci
-2Xi(C1 - fv2) + (Cf - Ci) 
-2xa* + b* 
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Notice that the difference between the two distances is a linear function of the voter's 
position. This suggests that if: 
(26) 
and a0 and /30 are identified then you could substitute -2Xia* + b* for Dil - Di2 and
recover reduced form estimates: 
Pr(� = 1)  
So one could recover: 
f(ao + /31(-2Xia*) + /31b*)
f((ao + /31b*) + (-2a*/31)Xi)
a ao + /31b*
� -2a* /31 
from standard MNL estimates (i .e . ;  binomial logit in this case) .
( 27) 
(28) 
To explicate these points, we used conditional logit to estimate the simulation 
model we reported earlier in Table 3. Since the simulation model is a spatial model that 
does include the position of the party, the conditional logit estimates faithfully correspond 
to the true model. The conditional logit estimates are reported in Table Bl. What is 
of interest here are predicted probabilities from conditional logit and multinomial logit. 
We report predicted probabilities for a voter who we move from -2 to 2 along the x­
axis in table B2 . Notice that the multinomial logit model predicts probability estimates 
identical to the conditional logit model, despite using less information. This suggests 
that if we were to compute the first-difference to estimate the impact of a change in 
respondents' characteristics on the probability of of voting for any party these would be 
identical across the conditional logit and multinomial logit estimates. For instance, both 
conditional logit and multinomial logit predict that a respondent moving from (-2 ,0) to 
(-1 .5,0) would cause a .07 change in the probability of voting for party 1 .  However, 
multinomial logit cannot produce an estimate of the change in predicted probability 
relative to changes in positions of the parties because the position of the party is . not 
included in the multinomial logit model! 
[Table B2 Here) 
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Notes 
1 .  We use the term 'conditional logit' to encompass models that combine both choice­
specific and individual specific variables. 
2 .  Conditional logit estimates presented here were computed with SST. Limdep and 
Stata are other commonly used packages which allow for estimation of the con­
ditional logit model. Estimates for appropriate syntax in these packages are 
archived along with the data for this article. 
3. We use the following terminology. We refer to a logit model where the dependent vari­
able can take more than two values and the independent variables are individual­
specific as multinomial logit; it may be referred to elsewhere as Polychotomous 
logit. Our use is consistent with Maddala's (1983) use of this term. This should 
not be confused with conditional logit, as developed by McFadden (1974) . Con­
ditional logit is defined as a logit model where the dependent variable takes 
more than two values and the independent variables are choice-specific. An ad­
ditional complexity emerges when we consider a logit model which includes both 
individual- and choice-specific independent variables: this we consider a gen­
eralization of the conditional logit model, and we will also term these models 
conditional logit models. Later in the paper, we turn to a probit model with both 
individual- and choice-specific variables. To maintain consistency with most ex­
isting literature, we will call this the multinomial probit model. Hausman and 
Wise ( 1978) use the term conditional probit; but Maddala ( 1983) , Amemiya 
( 1985) , and Greene (1993) in subsequent texts have consistently used the term 
multinomial probit . 
4 . The British Election Study, 1987, was collected by A.  Heath, R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice,
and Social and Community Planning Research. The data is distributed by the 
ESRC Data Archive and the ICPSR. 
5. Whitten and Palmer compare multinomial logit estimates to binomial logit estimates
not of successive pair-wise comparisons, but rather to binomial logit estimates of 
'incumbent' versus 'non-incumbent'. This coding scheme of the dependent vari­
ables is really simply an induced measurement error: the resulting comparisons 
say nothing about multinomial logit vs binomial logit .  Of course Whitten and 
Palmer are absolutely correct in suggesting that researchers avoid recoding a tri­
chotomous variable into a dichotomous variable: but they sho:uld not translate 
that advice into unduly broad claims regarding multinomial logit. 
6 . However, the standard errors in Table 2 are almost identical across the multinomial
logit ·and binomial logit estimates, suggesting that multinomial logit will have no 
more statistical power than successive binomial logit estimates. 
7. In the models we consider here, the multinomial logit model allows the issue pa­
rameters to vary across choices, whereas the issue parameters in the conditional 
lo git models presented here do not. However, the conditional logit model can be 
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specified with the issue parameters varying across choices . 
8 . We measure the party's position as the sample average placement of the party by all
respondents. 
9. This technique is similar to that employed by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) , and
later by Nagler (1991 ,  1992) to estimate the impact of an institutional change in 
voting rules on turnout. In both cases the key is to change a variable of interest 
and then estimate new predicted probabilities for. each voters, then aggregate 
over all voters to measure the total impact of the change. 
10 . See Alvarez, Bowler, and Nagler (1996) for a demonstration of this .
1 1 .  We discuss more fully the technical relationship between multinomial logit and con­
ditional logit estimates in Appendix B. 
12 . Though the Hausman-Wise formulation allows for the stochastic component to be a
function of characteristics of the alternatives - a backdoor way of letting substance 
m .  
13. GEV is equivalent to  nested logit when the coefficient of inclusive value is not con­
strained to be 1 .  
14. See Alvarez and Nagler (1995) , Appendix I for a description of the model.
15. See Alvarez and Nagler (1994) for a comparison of conditional logit, GEV, and multi­
nomial probit estimates. 
16 . By common specification of the spatial model we mean the specification in which
voters are assumed to evaluate their utility for each party through quadratic 
(squared) issue distances. The simple proof we provide here is dependent upon
this particular functional form for voter utilities. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Discrete Choice Models 
Generalized 
Multinomial Conditional Extreme Multinomial 
Logit Lo git Value Pro bit 
Alternative Specific Variables No Yes Yes Yes 
Correlated Disturbances No No Some Yes 
Includes Position of Party No Yes Yes · Yes
Can Correctly Measure 
1ifovement by Parties No Yes Yes Yes 
Assumes IIA Yes Yes No No 
Can Correctly Measure 
Omission of a Party No No Sometimes Yes 
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Table 2 
Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit Estimates 
British Election - 1987 
Conservative/ Alliance Labour/ Alliance 
MNL BL MNL BL 
Intercept -4.33* -4.40* 4.55* 5.26* 
(.74) ( .76) (.81 )  ( .86) 
Defense . 14* . 17* -. 17* - .19* 
( .03) (.03) (.03) ( .03) 
Phillips Curve .08* . 10* -.03 -.05 
(.02) (.03) ( .03) ( .03) 
Taxation . 13* .14* -.06** - .08* 
(.03) (.03) (.03) ( .04) 
National. . 16* . 16* -. 16* - .20* 
(.03) ( .03) (.03) (.03) 
Redist. .07* .06* -.08* - .09* 
(.02) ( .02) (.03) (.03) 
Crime .08* .08* .02 .02 
( .03) (.03) (.02) ( .02) 
Welfare . 1 1 *  . 12* -. 1 1 *  -.10* 
( .02) (.02) (.03) ( .03) 
South -.12 -.06 -.41 * -.45* 
(. 16) (.17) (.21) ( .22) 
Midlands - .26 -.26 -.12 - . 15  
(. 17) ( . 17) (.21) (.21 ) 
North -.03 .03 .66* .61 * 
(. 17) ( . 18)  ( . 19) ( .20) 
Wales -.40 -.41 1.41 * 1 .46* 
(.35) (.36) (.31 )  ( .33) 
Scot -.36 - .42** .68* .61 * 
( .25) ( .26) (.25) (.26) 
Union -.50 - .49* .37* .35* 
( . 16) ( . 16) ( .16) ( . 17) 
Public Employee .04 .03 - .05 .03 
( . 15 (. 15 (.16 ( . 16  
Blue Collar .09 . 14  .70* .80* 
( . 15) ( . 16) (.17) ( . 17) 
Gender .29* .33* .04 -.03 
( . 14) ( . 14) ( .15) ( .16) 
Age .03 .03 - .21 * - .24* 
( .05) ( .05) (.05) ( .05) 
Homeowner .31** .26 -.55* -52* 
( . 18) ( .18) (.17) (. 17) 
Income .07* .07* -.05 -.07* 
( .03) (;03) ( :03) (.03) 
Education - .81 * - .92* -.54 -.65** 
(.31) ( .31) (.35) ( .36) 
Inflation .28* .31 * -.00 .05 
(. 10) (. 1 1 )  ( . 12) (.12) 
Taxes .02 - .04 -. 1 1  - . 15* 
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
Unempl. .30* .30 .04 .08 
( .06) (.06) (.07) (.08) 
Number of Observations 2131 24 1494 2131 1 172 
Table 3 
Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit Estimates 
of a Simulated Spatial Model 
MNL 
Prob(Y=2)/ 
Prob(Y=l)/ 
ao - .42 
( . 1 1 )  
/Jx .98 
( . 04) 
/3y 1 .44 
( . 05) 
Observations 5000 
BL 
Prob(Y=2)/ 
Prob(Y=l)/ 
- .43 
( . 12 )  
. 94 
( .05) 
1 .40 
( . 06) 
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MNL BL 
Prob(Y=3)/ Prob(Y 3)/ 
Prob(Y=l )  Prob(Y=l)  
- . 04 - . 04 
( . 10) ( . 1 1) 
1 . 99 2 .07 
( .06) ( . 10) 
- .01 - .01  
( .03) . ( .03) 
Table 4 
Conditional Logit Estimates 
British Election - 1987 
Conservative/ Alliance Labour/ Alliance 
Defense a 
Phillips Curve 
Taxation 
National. 
Redist. 
Crime 
Welfare 
Intercept 
South 
Midlands 
North 
Wales 
Scot 
Union 
Public Employee 
Blue Collar 
Gender 
Age 
Homeowner 
Income 
Education 
· ,Inflation 
Taxes 
Unempl. 
.82 
(.69) 
-.15 
(.17) 
-.29** 
(.17) 
-.06 
(.18) 
.48 
(.36) 
-.41 
( .25) 
-.50* 
(.16} 
.09 
(.15) 
.11 
(.15) 
.28* 
(.14) 
.02 
( .05) 
.37* 
(.18) 
.07* 
(.03) 
-.82* 
(.32) 
· ;28* 
(.10)
.01 
(.07) 
.28* 
( .06) 
-.18* 
(.02) 
-.11* 
(.02) 
-.16* 
(.02) 
-.18* 
(.02) 
-.08* 
(.02) 
-.10* 
(.05) 
-.14* 
(.02) 
3 pred. 70.3 
n 2131 
2.53* 
(.75) 
-.44* 
(.21) 
.19 
(.20) 
.64* 
(.19 
1.3* 
(.31) 
.69* 
(.25) 
.37* 
(.16) 
-.02 
( .16) 
.70* 
(.16) 
.00 
( .15) 
-.22* 
(.05) 
-.54* 
( .16) 
-.06 
( .03) 
-.61 ** 
(.35) 
-.03 
(.11) 
- .10 
(.07) 
(.01 
(.07) 
a The seven issues represent distance - absolute value - from the respondent to the 
mean of the party position. 
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Table 5 
Conditional Logit Estimates of Effect of Movement 
By the Labour Party +/- 1/2 Standard Deviation - British Election - 1987 
Conservatives Labour Alliance 
Baseline .xx .xx .xx 
Defense + 1/2 (J 45 .7  28 .3 26 .0 
= 1/2 (J 44.7  30 .6 24.8 
Difference . - 1 . 0  2 .3  - 1 .3 
Phillips + 1/2 (J 45 . 2 29 .7 25 .2  
- 1/2 (J 45. 3  29. 0 25 . 7
Difference 0 .2  -0 .7 0 .6  
Taxation + 1/2 (J 45 . 6 28 .6 25 .8 
- 1/2 (J 45 . 1 29.4 25 .5 
Difference -0 . 5  0 . 8  -0 .3  
Nationalization + 1/2 (J 45. 9 27.7 26 .4 
- 1/2 (J 44.6 30.8 24.6 
Difference - 1 . 3  3 . 1  - 1 . 8  
Redistribution + 1/2 (J 45 . 3 29 .2 25 .5  
- 1/2 (J 45. 2 29.4 25 .4 
Difference -0 . 1  0 . 2  -0 .0 
Crime + 1/2 (J 45 . 6 28.4 26 .0 
- 1/2 (J 44.9 29 .9 25 . 1
Difference -0 .7 1 . 5  0 . 8  
Welfare + 1/2 (J 45 .4  29 .3  25 .4  
- 1/2  (J 45 . 2 29 .3 25 .6 
Difference -0 .2 0 .0  0 .2  
A ll Issues + 1/2 (J 47. 1 24.9 28.0 
- 1/2 (J 43 . 5 31 . 8  24. 7
'Difference -3 .6 6 .8 -3 .2  
Note: Estimated impact of the Labour party moving from one-half a 
standard deviation to the left of its mean. perceived position to one-half 
a standard-deviation to the right of its mean perceived position on each 
of seven issues. The final row simulates Labour moving simultaneously 
on all seven issues. Column entries are estimated aggregate vote-shares. 
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Table 6: 
Multinomial Probit Estimates, 1987 British Election - (Alliance Coefficient 
N orma!ized to Zero) 
Independent Variables Conservatives Labour 
Defense - . 14 
( .01 
U nernployrnent /Inflation - .09* 
Taxation 
( .02 
-. 13* 
Nationalization 
( .02 
-. 14* 
Redistribution 
( .01) 
- .07* 
Crime 
( .01) 
-.08*
Welfare 
( .03)
- .1 1  *
Constant .35 
( .01) 
1 .82*
( .51) ( .45) 
South -.09 - .29* 
( .07) ( .09) 
Midlands -.23* - . 11  
( .08) ( .09) 
North - .12  .43* 
( . 10) ( . 1 1) 
Wales - .48* .94* 
( .24) ( . 18) 
Scotland - .41 * .47* 
( .13) ( . 14) 
Union Member - .44* .26* 
( .07) ( .07) 
Public Sector Employee .08 .01 
( .06) ( .08) 
Blue Collar .02 .46* 
( .09) ( .08) 
Female .21* -.04 
( .07) ( .07) 
Age .03 - . 16* 
( .03) ( . 03) 
Horne .Ownership .36* - .37* 
(.08) (.08) 
Family Income .06* - .05* 
( .02) ( .02) 
Education - .62* - .45* 
( .21) ( .20)  
Inflation .23* - .01 
( .07) ( .06) 
Unemployment .23* - .00 
( .04) ( .04) 
Taxes .02 - .07 
( .04) ( .04) 
De A .02 
DLA 
( .06)
.34* 
DcL 
( .08) 
-.39* 
(.07) 
Number of Obs 2131 
LL 1476. 5  
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Table 7 
Estimated Aggregate Vote Shares: 
Three Party and Two Party Races 
Three Party Race 
Conservative 
Labour 
Alliance 
Two Party Race 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conditional 
Lo git 
45 . 2
29 .5 
25 .3  
59 . 1  
40.9 
Multinomial 
Pro bit 
. 44.9 
29 .8 
25 .3 
57 .4 
42.6 
Column entries are predicted aggregate vote shares by Conditional 
Logit and Multinomial Probit , for three-party races and two-party 
races. 
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Table 8 
Vote Shares and Individual Probabilities : 
IIA Does Not Aggregate 
Probabilities From Probabilities From 
Two Cand Race Three Cand Race 
Voter Pc l{C, L} PL l{C, L} Pc l{C, L, M} PL I {  c, L, .M} PM l{C, L, J\1} 
-2 .00 1 .00 .00 .99 . 0 1  
- . 5  . 12  .88 .08 .62 . 29 
0 .50 .50 . 24 . 24 . 5 1  
. 2 5  . 73 . 27  .33 . 1 2  . 55 
. 75 .95 .05 .49 .02 .49 
Mean .46 .54 .23 .40 . 37 
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Table B l  
Conditional Logit Estimates of a Spatial Model 
CL 
Prob(Y=2)/ 
Prob(Y=l )  
ao - . 00 
( . 07) 
f3x - . 25 
( .01)  
/3y - . 36 
( .01) 
Observations 5000 
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CL 
Prob(Y=3)/ 
Prob(Y=l)/ 
.05 
( . 08) 
- .25
( .01 ) 
- .36 
( .01)
x y 
-2 0 
- 1 . 5  0 
- 1  0 
- . 5  0 
0 0 
. 5  0 
1 0 
1 . 5  0 
2 0 
Table B2 
Multinomial Logit Estimates and 
Conditional Logit Estimates 
of Probabilities for an Individual in the Issue Space 
Probability Probability Probability 
Party 1 :  . Party 2 :  Party 3 
F1(A;JNL) F1(CL) F2(NINL) F2(CL) F3(A;JNL) F3(CL) 
.90 . 90 .08 .08 .02 . 02 
.83 .83 . 12 . 12 . 04 .04 
. 73 .73 . 18 . 18  . 10 . 10 
.57 .56 . 23 . 23 . 20 . 2 1  
. 38  .38 .25 .25 .37 .38 
. 2 1  .21  . 23 .23 . 56 . 56 
. 10 . 10 . 18  . 18  . 72 . 72 
.04 . 04 . 12 . 12 .83 .83 
. 02 .02 .08 .08 .90 .90 
Estimated probabilities are from a multinomial logit model including the respondents' 
position on the X and Y axes as independent variables, and from a conditional logit 
model estimated with the actual distance between the voter and party. 
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Figure 1 
Social Issue 
(0 ,2) = Party 3 
Economic Issue 
(-2 ,0) = Party 2 (0,0) = Voter (2 ,0) = Party 1 
\ ( 1 .95 ,0) = Party 4 
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